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THE LEGAL MECHANISM OF
RATIONING
THiOMAS E. FAIRcHILD*
I. EARLY PERIOD
R ATIONING began on January- 5, 1942, the date on which certifi-
cates for new rubber tires were first issued by local Tire Ration-
ing Boards. Immediately after Pearl Harbor it became apparent that
tires must be rationed, and a legal basis for such action was found in
the Priorities and Allocation Act of 1940.1 That Act authorized the
President, if "satisfied that the fulfillment of requirements for the de-
fense of the United States will result in a shortage in the supply of any
material for defense or for private account or for export," to "allocate
such material in such manner and to such extent as he shall deem nec-
essary or appropriate in the public interest and to promote the national
defense." The President had already delegated authority over allocation
to the Office of Price Management, later replaced by the War Produc-
tion Board and on December 10, 1941, the OPM had (by Supple-
mentary Order M-15-b) prohibited virtually all sales, leases, trades,
deliveries, or transfers of new tires and tubes.
Because rationing would directly affect all civilians, and because
there are certain fundamental relationships between rationing and
price control, it was decided the OPA should ration. Accordingly, the
President and OPM joined in issuing Supplementary Order M-15-C
on December 27, 1941, prescribing the terms of tire rationing and
delegating the enforcement, interpretation and amendment of the order
to OPA.
On January 24, 1942, the President and WPB joined in Directive
No. 1, delegating to OPA the exercise of rationing control over the
sale of products at retail, or to an ultimate consumer. Since that date,
the rationing powers of OPA have at times been enlarged and modified
by supplementary directives and amendments. It may be emphasized
at this, point that the responsibility of OPA is limited to providing for
the equitable distribution of specific amounts of specific commodities.
The type of goods to be rationed and the size of the "deposits" in the
"bank account" against which OPA issues the "checks" are determined
by other agencies on the basis of the facts as to supply, production,
and military requirements.
*Acting District Rationing Executive; District Rationing Attorney; LLB.,
University of Wisconsin; B.A., Cornell University; Member of Wisconsin Bar.
"Pub. L. No. 89, 77th Congress, 1st Sess. C. 157; 50 U.S.C.A. Appx.
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During the early period of rationing, no penalties were provided by
Congress for violations of allocation or rationing orders. Where in-
tended violations were discovered in advance several federal District
Courts issued injunctions. 2 Inadvertent violators frequently were will-
ing to return the goods illegally obtained where the matter was brought
to their attention. At the time of the original "freeze" order on new
tires, dealers had been required to report the number of new tires and
tubes on hand, and in several instances where wilful misstatements
were shown, violators were prosecuted under a federal statute making
it a penal offense wilfully to make a false statement in a matter under
the jurisdiction of a United States government agency.3 Indirect means
could be used in specific instances. For example when a tire dealer who
happened to have been named a tire inspector violated the order, the
local Board which appointed him gave considerable publicity to its
action in dismissing him.
On March 27, 1942, there was enacted the Second War Powers
Act 4 which provided enforcement teeth for the rationing program. As
in the Priorities and Allocations Act the powers were given to the
President, with the provision that he may exercise the power through
any government agency. The Act provided that a wilful violation of
an order or regulation would be a misdemeanor, and established a
penalty of not more than $10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both. It also gave the District Courts jurisdiction of
any civil action to enforce liabilities or duties created by, or to enjoin
violations of regulations or orders, and provided that no person should
be held liable for a default under a contract, resulting from compliance.
II. THE RATION ORDERS
The Ration Orders now in force locally are as follows:
Tires and new R.O. 1A, Effective Dec. 1, 1942,
tubes 65 Amendments, Original freeze
effective Dec. 10,
1941.
Passenger Cars R.O. 2B, Effective March 6, 1943,
(All 1942's, and 10 Amendments, Original freeze
1941's driven effective Jan. 1.
less than 1,000 1942.
miles.)
Sugar R.O. 3, Effective April 20, 1942,
109 Amendments
2 Henderson v. Smith-Douglas Co., 44 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Va., 1942).
3 Sec. 35A, Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. 80.4 Pub. L. No. 507, 77th Cong. 2nd Sess. c. 199; 50 U.S.C.A. Appx.)
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Typewriters
Gasoline
Rubber Footwear
(Boots and
work shoes)
Bicycles
Stoves
Fuel Oil
Processed Foods
Meats and Fats
Shoes
R.O. 4A, Effective Dec. 28, 1942,
7 Amendments,
R.O. 5C, Effective Dec. 1, 1942,
94 Amendments (In this area)
R.O. 6A, Effective June 5, 1943,
4 Amendments,
R.O. 7, Effective July 9, 1942,
10 Amendments
R.O. 9A, Effective Aug. 24, 1943,
4 Amendments,
R.O. 11, Effective Oct. 22, 1942,
92 Amendments
Rev. R.O. 13, Effective Dec. 30, 1943,
1 Amendment,
R.O. 16, Effective March 29, 1943,
96 Amendments
R.O. 17, Effective Feb. 7, 1943,
49 Amendments
Original order
effective
March 25, 1942.
Original order
effective Sept. 29,
1942.
Original order
effective Dec. 19,
1942.
Original order
effective March 1,
1943, and Feb. 21,
1943.
The number of amendments listed above is correct as of January
3, 1944. All orders and amendments are published in the Federal Reg-
ister, but they are, of course, more readily available in various commer-
cial services. The multiplicity of amendments stems in part from
changing conditions and in part from the sheer complexity of the task
of complete national regulation of the distribution of a commodity.
The sequence in which specific subjects are treated varies from
order to order. Apart from that, however, the contents of the orders
fall into a regulai- pattern. A group of sections prohibit certain acts
involving the rationed commodity. One such section prohibits all
"transfer" of the commodity unless such transaction is authorized by
some other specific section of the order.
The word "transfer" is very broadly defined in a section devoted
to the definition of terms. As an example, Ration Order 13 (Processed
Foods) defines transfer as "to sell, give, exchange, lend, deliver, or
consign." It includes any transfer of possession or title, however accom-
plished, and any movement of goods from one establishment to another.
The use by any "person" of "processed foods" which he holds for sale
or transfer is considered a transfer of those foods to himself. Also a
transfer takes place when an industrial user uses processed foods which
1944]
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he produced or imported after October 4, 1943. However, delivery to
a carrier for shipment is not regarded as a transfer to the carrier; and
delivery by the carrier to the consignee is not regarded as a transfer
by the carrier.
Other sections of the order describe certain transfers which are
permitted without the exchange of coupons, certificates, stamps, ration
checks, or other ration evidences. For example, Ration Order 13 pro-
vides that "no points need be given up for a transfer of processed
foods as part of a judicial proceeding, or by operation of law, or for a
transfer made under the direction of or pursuant to the order of a
court or by judicial process." Exports are generally permitted, because
control is exercised by other agencies.
Other sections prescribe the manner in which goods may be trans-
ferred, in exchange for ration evidence, between dealers at different
distribution levels, and the manner in which they may be transferred
to consumers, in exchange for ration evidences.
Another group of sections covers the registration of the dealers and
producers at the different levels of distribution, and prescribes the
records which must be kept and the reports which must be made. The
procedure under which new businesses may receive permission to oper-
ate or under which existing establishments may be transferred are also
stated.
Under most of the orders a dealer's inventory of the rationed com-
modity plus his ration evidences on hand should not vary, except for
such reasons as the change in point value in the processed foods and
meats and fats programs. Under Ration Order 5C, for example,
(gasoline) a dealer's total registered storage capacity is his fixed
allowable inventory. The amount of gasoline on hand plus gallonage
value of ration evidences on hand must always equal such storage
capacity. Provisions are made for issuance of ration evidence to offset
certain justified losses of the commodity or of other ration evidence.
"Flowback" is the term used to describe the control resulting from
requiring ration evidence to be surrendered at each level of distribution
as well as at retail. Ration evidence is issued by OPA initially to the
users of products, i.e. consumers, institutionai users (eating places),
industrial users, and industrial consumers. Some of the evidence issued
may not be used, but whatever amount is used to buy commodities, an
equal amount must be returned to OPA at one of the higher levels of
distribution in order to insure that the theoretically closed system is
correctly operating. In many cases, the ration evidence must be ac-
counted for by the producers, or the importers of the commodity. In
the case of gasoline it is considered that the state tax laws impose an
effective control upon the licensed wholesaler (licensed distributor as
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he is called in the Ration Order) and the flowback of ration evidence
stops with him.
The issuance of ration evidence to the ultimate user is committed
to the Local War Price and Rationing Boards. A group of sections in
each ration order deals with the mechanism and basis of such issuance.
Food and shoe rationing for consumers is based primarily upon a
mathematically equal distribution of a portion of the available supply.
General purpose books now in use were issued under .General Ration
Orders 12 and 14. Food is allocated to institutional users under Gen-
eral Ration Order 5, the amount allowable being determined according
to a formula which involves the usage of food in December, 1942, the
number of persons served, the dollar revenue, and certain factors estab-
lished by OPA. Food is allocated to industrial users (now under Gen-
eral Ration Order 16) in an amount produced by applying a percentage
to the amount used in a base period.
The issuance of fuel oil for heating purposes is, generally speak-
ing, regulated by a percentage of the usage in 1941-'42, subject, in the
case of private dwellings, to certain maxima and minima established
by OPA on the basis of statistical studies as being equitable and neces-
sary modifications of a percentage cut. Tires and gasoline, except for
the automatic issuance of Basic rations for all cars other than fleet and
official cars, involve the exercise of judgment in individual cases by the
Local Boards. Eligibility (the question whether a car or truck will be
used for one of a list of specified purposes) and need for the rationed
commodity are the paramount issues for decision by the Boards. The
need for deciding close questions of fact is indicated by the fact that
3,061 gasoline appeals have been decided by the Milwaukee District
Office in one year.
Each food rationing order contains a provision permitting the filing
at the Local Board of applications for certain adjustments or order
relief, and requiring that these applications be forwarded through the
District Office to Washington until such time as the Board or District
Office is authorized to act. Adjustments have at times been granted by
the Washington office in certain cases not otherwise provided for. As
the types of cases where the policy of the rationing program required
the granting of relief have crystallized, the Washington office has from
time to time either amended the order, or issued instructions to District
Offices or Boards to grant certain relief without forwarding the appli-
cation.
Two other series of orders issued by the Administrator are of
importance in the rationing field. General Ration Orders from 1
through 16 deal with a variety of matters of general application.
General Ration Order 5 deals with the allocations of rationed food
to institutional users. General Ration Order 11 deals with the alloca-
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tion of rationed foods to replace foods used in products acquired by the
Army, Navy and 6ther designated agencies. General Ration Order 16
deals with the allocation of rationed foods to industrial users.
General Ration Order 3A deals with the manner in which persons
permitted by other orders to open ration bank accounts must deal with
such accounts. This order is of great importance since ration evidence
under most of the programs is deposited in a bank after one or two
transactions and is thereafter represented by a bank credit. General
Ration Order 7 concerns the required method of surrendering stamps
or coupons where gummed sheets are not available, and General Ration
Order 8 sets forth certain uniform prohibitions which apply to all
ration orders, such as improper acts with reference to ration docu-
ments, attempts to violate a ration order, and the transfer of any ra-
tioned commodity in the course of trade or business at a price in excess
of the maximum established by OPA.
General Ration Order 1 covers the granting of exceptions by the
Deputy Administrator in Charge of Rationing, at Washington, where
the granting of the exception would not defeat or impair the effective-
ness or policy of the Ration Order involved, and would not be an
exception to standards of eligibility or need.
Procedural Regulation No. 12 deals with the replacement of ration
books or coupon sheets when lost, stolen, destroyed, mutilated or
wrongfully withheld.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Procedural Regulation No. 9 sets forth an appeal procedure by
which original decisions of Local Boards and District Directors may
be reviewed. This procedure applies generally to decisions on the
granting of rations by Local Boards and to a few types of original deci-
sions made by the District Director under the respective ration orders.
The time limit within which to appeal is thirty days. An appeal on
form R-122 is filed with the Local Board which made the decision.
The Board reconsiders its action and, if it does not reverse its prior
decision, forwards the appeal and file to the District Director. A written
decision is issued by the District Director. A second appeal may be
filed with the District Director who reconsiders, and, unless he reverses
his prior decision, forwards the file to the Regional Administrator.
A similar procedure applies to appeals from the decision of the
Regional Administrator to the Washington Office, except that the
Washington Office may simply refuse to pass upon the appeal. Appeals
to Washington are decided by the Deputy Administrator in Charge of
Rationing.
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IV. SPECIFIC ALLOCATION ORDERS
As has been indicated, a ration order specifies how commodities
shall be allocated by stating fact standards upon the basis of which
ultimate users may receive rationed commodities and rules under which
dealers may receive them for resale. Principles of need, of essentiality
to the war effort and public welfare, and of equality of treatment are
all recognized up to a degree and the result is expressed in the ration
orders. The Local Boards, and in a few instances, the District Offices,
decide when the standards have been met. Occasions arise, however,
where the impropriety with which an individual uses or deals in the
rationed commodity results in the issuance of an allocation order which
relates to the specific individual and diverts the flow .of the commodity
from him, permanently or temporarily.
One instance of this type of order is the revocation or denial of a
gasoline ration, or right to receive a tire certificate, by a Local Board.
The revocation of a gasoline ration is provided for in Section 1394.8105
of Ration Order 5C. The order requires service of a three day notice
of hearing specifying the violation charged. After hearing, the Board
may issue its written order. An appeal may be filed within 15 days by
filing a statement of objections with the Board and the matter is then
heard de novo by the District Director or a Special Hearing Officer.
There is no further appeal within the OPA.
The matter may be originally noticed before a Special Hearing
Officer rather than a Local Board, and in such case appeal lies to the
Regional Hearing Commissioner.
Another instance of the specific allocation order is a suspension
order, prohibiting an individual from receiving or dealing in a rationed
commodity, and entered by a Regional Hearing Commissioner. Proce-
dural Regulation No. 4 provides for the issuance of such orders and
the administrative review thereof.
Where the Enforcement Department of OPA deems the action
warranted, by reason of violations of Ration Orders or General Ration
Orders, it may bring proceedings to have a suspension order issued. A
notice of hearing is served, giving at least three days notice. The hear-
ing may be held before a Hearing Commissioner or a Presiding Officer
designated by a Hearing Commissioner. The Procedural Regulation
specifies that the hearing must be public, that the respondent may be
represented by counsel, that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
shall not be controlling. Either the Enforcement Department or the
respondent may obtain the issuance of subpoenas. A stenographic re-
port must be taken. A Presiding Officer has no power to issue an order,
but makes an advisory report to the Hearing Commissioner, contain-
ing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. Briefs
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may be filed with the Hearing Commissioner, who issues the appro-
priate order.
An appeal may be taken by either party from any order entered.
Provision is made for the granting of a stay pending determination of
the appeal. The record, including the transcript, is forwarded to the
Office of the Hearing Administrator at Washington. Briefs may be
filed, and the Hearing Administrator affirms, reverses, or modifies the
order of the Hearing Commissioner.
As complete a separation as is possible is maintained between the
Hearing Administrator and his staff and the rest of the OPA. The
Hearing Administrator is responsible only to the Price Administrator.
Although Hearing Commissioners have their offices at the Regional
Offices of OPA, they are not, as are all other departments, subject to
appointment, dismissal and direction by the Regional Administrator.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A number of courts have sustained the validity of the Priorities
and Allocations Act, the Second War Powers Act, and several of the
Ration Orders issued thereunder. 5
The suspension order procedure has been challenged. It has been
asserted that the issuance of such an order is an exercise of judicial
power and is the imposition of a penalty by the executive. The contrary
position is that a suspension order is an allocation of a scarce com-
modity (or viewed from a different angle, the withdrawal of an allo-
cation), and the incidental hardships and disadvantageous conse-
quences do not make it other than remedial.
The decisions are in conflict, some having sustained the procedure
while others have held that it is invalid.'
The opposing theories are well stated in excerpts from the opin-
ions. In Wilemon v. Brown,8 the District Court conceded that "if there
was authority for the procedural order it sufficiently guarded the safety
and rights of the plaintiffs." The court proceeded, however, in part as
follows:
5Henderson v. Smith-Douglas Co., 44 F. Supp. 681, (E.D. Va., 1942); Hen-
derson v. Bryan, 46 F. Supp. 682, (S.D. Cal., 1942) ; United States v. Wright,
48 F. Supp. 687, (D.C. Del., 1943); Brown v. Bernstein, 49 F. Supp. 728, (D.C.
Pa., 1943); United States v. Beit Bros., 50 F. Supp. 590, (D.C. Conn. 1943);
United States v. Randall, 50 F. Supp. 139, (E.D. N. Y., 1943).
6 Perkins v. Brown, 52 F. Supp.-(S.D. Ga., Nov. 15, 1943) ; Pantaleo v. Brown,
52 F. Supp.-(S.D. N. Y., Dec. 6, 1943); Joliet Oil Corporation v. Brown, 52
F. Supp.-(N.D. Ill., Dec. 16, 1943); Wilemon v. Brown-F. (2d)-(C.C.A.
5th, Jan. 13, 1944).
7 B. Simon Hardware Co. v. Nelson, 52 F. Supp. 474, (D.C. D.C., 1943) ; Wile-
mon v. Brown, 51 F. Supp. 978, (N.D. Tex., 1943) (reversed by Circuit Court
of Appeals on Jan. 13, 1944).
8 Wilemon v. Brown, 51 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Tex., 1943).
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"If we consider the breadth and scope of the order entered
against the plaintiffs, we find considerable difficulty in conclud-
ing that it is 'merely remedial.' It is not the legitimate outgrowth
of the right to'allocate, or to ration. It borders on a confiscation
of the plaintiffs' business for two weeks. It destroys that busi-
ness for that period. Both employees and customers are, and
necessarily will be, demoralized. The loss will be heavy.
"One always feels the poverty of words when it comes to defin-
ing the simple. This case really must be ruled by deciding
whether this order was remedial or punitive,
"The Congress did not vest in the defendants such a power as
is here exhibited. If it did, it presumed to act improperly, which
presumption will not be indulged.
The 'Hearing Administrator' unknown to and unprovided for
by the Congress, presumes to conduct a court. Procedure is
prescribed by his superior for such conducting. He enters a
judgment concerning which there is no limit fixed. No Maxi-
mum. No Minimum. He acts without any fear of consequences
for malfeasance, or misfeasance. If he can suspend for two
weeks, he can suspend for two years. He is not only unknown to
the Congress, but he is unknown to the Constitution. Art. 3,
Sec. 1, vests such power in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The judges hold during good behavior, and receive a
stated compensation. They must be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. They may be impeached.
"What the 'Hearing Administrator' does is beyond the reach of
Executive forgiveness. He, himself, is beyond the reach of any
Constitutional removing power. He is a modem instance of pure
dictatorship.
"Sec. 2 of the same Article, vests this sort of power in all cases
arising under the Constitution. This is a case that arises directly
under the Constitution because of the declaration of war and
the following of that declaration by the passing of the statutes
out of which grow the delegations of authority for allocation.
As a result of such delegation of authority, there was conceived
and born a 'Hearing Administrator' who is and was without
Constitutional father or mother. No attempt at baptism in the
waters of conflict can change his parentage and make it legit-
imate.
"This view of a penalty, or, punishment, is sustained 'by a fur-
ther reading of the Allocation Act, which provided for the crim-
inal punishment of the citizen who violates its provisions, and
also for equitable restraints, both of which take place in named
courts."
In a unanimous decision reversing the District Court, the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, said of the suspended dealer:
"Nothing that is his is really taken from him. His private inter-
est has merely come into collision with a public interest and has
19441
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had to yield. A suspension which affects nothing but the ration-
ing of gasoline is a proper implementation of rationing and it
is not a penalty." 9
In Perkins v. Brown0 it was said:
"Under the Act the President, through his delegate, is author-
ized to allocate shortage materials 'in such manner, upon such
conditions and to such extent' as he shall deem necessary or
appropriate in the public interest and to promote the national
defense. It seems clear to me that a suspension order such as
here involved is authorized by that section of the Act. If the
rationing regulations had provided generally that vital materials
such as gasoline should be distributed only by named employees
of the government or that only those dealers who in the past
had observed the rationing regulations were eligible for alloca-
tion of rationed commodities, there could be little doubt that
such provision would be an exercise of thte statutory power to
allocate and to prescribe the conditions for allocation. Precisely,
the same effect is produced by a ration system which permits the
receipt and transfer of commodities by all dealers, subject to
subsequent elimination from eligibility of those found to have
violated the rationing regulations. The suspension order is itself
an allocation. Rationed commodities are allocated away from the
violator for a period deemed reasonable under the circum-
stances, and at the same time the amount actually or potentially
allocable to other and more trustworthy recipients of rationed
commodities has been increased. A distributor of gasoline may
be likened to a licensee whose license runs during good behavior.
"The authority to issue suspension orders established, it is im-
material that the order may have penalizing consequences. The
validity of the Administrative exercise of a granted power is not
impaired by consequences that collaterally may be of a punitive
character. The fact that the exercise of the granted power may
have penalizing effects which there was no statutory authority
to impose affirmatively as punishment does not impair the val-
idity of the exercise of the power.
"The suspension order here involved, however, is not in the con-
stitutional sense penal in its nature; it allocates; it controls, as
specifically authorized by the statute, the 'conditions' of eligibil-
ity for allocations; it revokes or modifies a license. None of these
things primarily is penal. The purpose of the order is not to
penalize but to remedy a disruption in the allocation program
and to correct an improper diversion in the flow of scarce com-
modities occasioned by the violator's misuse.
"The suspension orders involved in Wright v. Sec. & Exchange
Commission, 112 F (2d) 89 (CCA 2nd, 1940) in Nichols & Co.
v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F (2d) 651 (CCA 1st 1941);
and in Nelson v. Secretary of Agriculture, 133 F (2d) 453 (CCA
9 Wilemon v. Brown-F. (2d)-(C.C.A. 5th, Jan. 13, 1944).
10 Perkins v. Brown, 52 F. Supp.-(S.D. Ga., Nov. 15, 1943).
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7th 1943), though having penalizing effect, were specifically
characterized by the courts as remedial rather than punitive.
The word 'penalty' is sometimes loosely used to include all ac-
tions which involve hurtful or disadvantageous consequences
(cf. Wilemon v. Brown, DC, Ni Tex, as yet unreported). But
if the word is used in that loose sense it has no legal significance
in this case. Many an allocation of commodities on short supply
involves a 'penalty' (e.g., cutting the value of gasoline coupons
or ration points), so that the same act can be an allocation and
incidentally a 'penalty' at the same time. Moreover, the revoca-
tion of a license is clearly a 'penalty' in the loose sense referred
to above. Yet it is not that kind of a penalty which may not be
put into the hands of an administrative body without an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power. The inci-
dental effect of hardship resulting from such suspension order
can in no way detract from the essential nature of such order as
the means of avoiding misuse in a critical field. War by its na-
ture results in hardship. The power of Selective Service to draft
available manpower is in no sense diminished by the inevitable
hardship resulting to the. individuals and families affected. The
right of carrying on the peacetime pursuit of dealing in gasoline
is no more vested.
"The Hearing Commissioner and Hearing Administrator have
not presumed to act as judges in the sense of the Constitution
but have conducted themselves as delegates of the Administrator
in determining whether (to take) an allocation away from a vio-
lator on the conditions imposed upon dealers in a war-scarce-
commodity is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
to promote the national defense. The Administrator has dele-
gated to officers, divorced, as I understand it, from the cus-
tomary enforcement functions of his agency, his duty to with-
draw allocations from persons who have shown themselves to
be irresponsible or untrustworthy. The withdrawal may be tem-
porary (as here) or permanent, at least, for the duration of the
war emergency. He has likewise set up an administrative proce-
dure to accord a full and fair hearing for persons charged with
violations of the conditions of their eligibility to continue deal-
ing in rationed goods. This he has done so that an equitable sys-
tem of allocation shall not work inequitably as to a particular
individual. In the exercise of this function there is no exercise
of the 'judicial' powers of the United States. See Union Bridge
Co. v. United States, 204 US 364. This court has the same right
to review the determination of the Administrator to ascertain
whether the same is supported by substantial evidence as it has
to review the orders of peacetime administrative agencies. I can-
not regard the action by the Administration as a forbidden
exercise of the judicial power."
What may be regarded as the official view of OPA is the following
excerpt from a statement recently issued in answer to the Second
19441
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Intermediate Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Executive
Agencies:
"Exercise of the authority to allocate necessarily involves two
phases: (1) the affirmative direction of shortage material to
approved, essential users; and (2) a resultant withholding of
that material from other uses regarded as non-essential or
wasteful. For example, both Factory A and Factory B may seek
a certain lot of aluminum. A WPB allocation of that aluminum
to Factory A necessarily results in a withholding of the same
lot from Factory B.
"When, as in tire rationing, classes of eligible purchasers of new
tires are fixed, the administrative decision again involves a
choice among competing demands. Allocation of existing tire
supplies to the more essential users, physicians, clergymen, and
the like, means that tires will be withheld from users thought
less essential. This choice between the essential and the non-
essential, or between the worthy and the unworthy, is of the
essence of the power to allocate. Such a choice is authorized by
the Act so long as it can reasonably be said to be 'in the public
interest and to promote the national defense.
"The basic reason underlying rationing suspension orders is
simply that distributors who have shown themselves to be law-
abiding and trustworthy must be preferred to those whose past
unlawful conduct has shown a disregard of their wartime busi-
ness obligations. If a rationing regulation provided generally
that only those dealers were eligible for allocations who in the
past had observed the rationing regulations, clearly this provi-
sion would be 'necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and to promote the national defense.' Precisely the same effect
is produced by a rationing system which instead permits the
receipt and transfer of rationed commodities by all dealers, sub-
ject to the condition that those found to have violated the ration-
ing regulations will be eliminated from the eligible list. Differen-
tiation in treatment between the trustworthy and the untrust-
worthy is as just, reasonable, and necessary as differentiation
between essential and unessential uses."
